Abstract-In the smart grid, smart meters, and numerous control and monitoring applications employ bidirectional wireless communication, where security is a critical issue. In key management based encryption method for the smart grid, the Trusted Third Party (TTP), and links between the smart meter and the third party are assumed to be fully trusted and reliable. However, in wired/wireless medium, a man-in-middle may want to interfere, monitor and control the network, thus exposing its vulnerability. Acknowledging this, in this paper, we propose a novel two level encryption method based on two partially trusted simple servers (constitutes the TTP) which implement this method without increasing packet overhead. One server is responsible for data encryption between the meter and control center/central database, and the other server manages the random sequence of data transmission. Numerical calculation shows that the number of iterations required to decode a message is large which is quite impractical. Furthermore, we introduce One-class support vector machine (machine learning) algorithm for node-to-node authentication utilizing the location information and the data transmission history (node identity, packet size and frequency of transmission). This secures data communication privacy without increasing the complexity of the conventional key management scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION Smart grid is the modern power system infrastructure whose distribution system is upgraded via bidirectional communication, and pervasive and intelligent computing capabilities in order to provide improved control, efficiency, reliability and safety. In the arena of smart grid, the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is the distribution level building block. It consists of millions of meters interlinked by a hierarchical or mesh-connected or hybrid network. The meters communicate with the control center in a wireless fashion. The typical communication standards for the AMI are ZigBee, WiFi and LTE [1] . In the AMI, smart meters collect and store the instantaneous energy consumption and report it periodically to the back office (the control center) as against reporting of monthly total energy consumption recorded in the conventional meters. It also allows the consumers to actively engage in electricity trade by selling home-generated, unused electricity (from solar panel, windmill etc.) to the grid. AMI also outfits the service provider with control and monitoring equipment, including outage management, demand response, and disaster prevention and recovery information.
Since AMI has to use wireless communication, security issues become a critical problem. Observing the usage patterns, an adversary/thief can predict the presence of the targeted consumers at home which can be a threat to civil lives and privacy.
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Furthermore, from the fine grained energy consumption data, the home appliance companies receive information about the life style patterns of consumers and the energy utilization of their home appliances. Thus competing companies can use this valuable information in their businesses. The consumers might want to alter the consumption data to reduce their electricity bill. The most crucial thing is that the opponent/hacker might jam or take over the AMI network by sending false signal to meters on an unsecured system, which may cause power outage in a wide area as well as an imbalance in the demand generation model.
Like all other systems, AMI needs to comply with the requirements of security-confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability (non-repudiation) [2] , [3] . Confidentially implies the accessibility of data by any authorized entity, and any intentional or unintentional disclosures of data must be denied. Since the main objective of the AMI is to collect energy consumption information that conveys consumer life patterns, habits and energy usage, this data must be concealed. Integrity requires reflecting authentic data correctly without any modifications, additions, or deletions. If any unauthorized subject performs (or attempts to perform) such actions, this must be detected. Since not only the hacker, but also the consumer, might want to alter the consumption data by trapping and resending, the integrity of data is very important. Availability requires the accessibility of data by an authorized user on demand. If the required data is not found at the time of need, the system violates the availability aspect of the security requirement of the system. Any natural or intentional incidents (i.e. hacking) must not hamper the system from operating correctly. For example, if the hacker wants to jam the network, the system must comply with the availability aspect. Accountability (non-repudiation) means non-deniability of an action, i.e., the entities used in receiving or transmitting data must not deny it. If an entity does not receive data, it will not, subsequently, state that it has received it. In the AMI network, accountability ensures a timely response to the command and control, and integrity of billing profile, etc.
The main drawback of implementing security scheme in AMI is the limited memory and low computational ability of the smart meters. Furthermore, AMI is a huge network, consists of millions of meters. So we need a lightweight but robust security scheme. In the literature, the key managementbased encryption method has been proposed as a prominent security scheme for smart grid, which includes a Trusted Third Party (TTP) [4] [5] [6] . In all TTP management systems, it is assumed that the TTP is fully trusted. However, the TTP itself, and the meters and communication links among the TTP and the meters could also be compromised.
Based on the semi-trusted servers of the TTP and untrustworthy/unreliable communication links, in this paper, we propose a key management scheme which includes a node (meter) to the Service Provider (SP) data encryption as well as randomized packet transmission. In our early work [7] , the scheme consists of two independent servers. The master server manages the public-private key before data is sent to the back office of the SP. Additionally, the auxiliary server receives the random sequence of data from the smart meter, in response to the public key sent by the master server. Both the private key associated with public key and the random sequence are used to retrieve the data at the back office. In this paper, we extend [7] by using Received Signal Strength (RSS) and One class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) techniques for node to node authentication. RSS is used for localization of meters using the received signal strength from neighbor meters. On the other hand, OCSVM is used to detect new and outlier data/packet, using current and previous data transmission history, which has not been considered in the literature to our best knowledge. The introduction of two separate servers for key management and random sequenced packet transmission increases robustness in security in untrustworthy communication medium and servers. Additionally, OCSVM based node authentication increases sturdiness in key management system without increasing any overhead and it is easy to implement in devices with limited memory and computational ability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the literature review of the security schemes proposed for the AMI. In Section III, details of the proposed structure of the AMI are introduced. In Section IV, the theoretical background of RSS based localization, OCSVM and entropy of data packet are presented. Section V presents the communication and traffic flow among smart meters, servers and SPs. Furthermore, in Section VI, simulation results and theoretical security strength of a data packet are analyzed. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the recent years, security issues in AMI attracted significant attention of different communities (electrical engineers, computer science graduates, IT experts etc.) due to extensive use of wireless communication. In [8] , a 128-bit Asymmetric Encryption Scheme Galois Counter Mode (AES GCM) cryptography based security IC has been proposed and performance comparison between the hardware-based and software-based crypto-engines is presented. In [9] , [10] , a game theory based security system has been introduced where two parties (an attacker and a defender) interact pro-actively and reactively for different attack severity levels. In [11] , several nodes are selected randomly for intermediate node-to-node authentication. Even though this reduces the packet overhead, it still has vulnerability in the middle of communication. In [12] , randomization of the AMI configuration has been proposed to make its behavior unpredictable to the hacker, whereas the behavior is predictable to the control center. In [13] , Costas et al. introduced anonymization of data by randomizing node identity using a TTP. But communication overhead is increased due to the need for the TTP to communicate with all nodes simultaneously. Moreover, retrieving information from a large network becomes complicated. In [14] , homomorphic encryption has been introduced, which also has the problem of retrieving data from a large network being complicated.
In [15] , an Identity Based Signcryption (IBS) for zero configuration encryption and authentication has been proposed for end-to-end communication solution. In [16] , a node-tonode encryption with its own secret key has been proposed. But for a large network, the packet overhead increases for both IBS and node-to-node authentication. To distribute the keys and control center. manage the network, a wireless sensor network based Public Key management Infrastructure (PKI) has been proposed in [17] which has problem of generation large number of unique keys. In [18] , a key management system has been introduced based on DLMS/COSEM standard providing two main information security features: data access security and data transport security. Since DLMS/COSEM is an open standard and allows a number of variations in the protocol implementation, it increases the complexity in the client side. In [19] , a two layer security scheme for meter to Data Concentrator (DC) and DC to control center of SP has been provided in Taiwan. For meter to DC, IEC 62056 based encryption method, and for DC to the back office, public key management system has been proposed. But here in each time step, encryption and decryption need to be performed twice.
Different than these earlier work in the literature, in our proposed scheme, we provide improvements in the key management schemes for AMI systems. In particular, in our approach, we introduce randomization of data transmission as well as node-to-node authentication method considering unreliable communication scenario and using machine learning technique. The introduction of randomization and the machine learning based node authentication increases the robustness of the key management system without increasing any overhead.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF AMI
The AMI is a web like network with millions of meters as shown in Fig. 1 . In here we provide the insights into AMI architecture, which encompasses components including home appliances, control center of utility service provider and security infrastructure.
• Smart meter: It is a solid state device responsible for collecting, storing and sending data to the back office using wireless communication and at interval less than 1 hour. The home appliances are connected to a smart meter by a network, forming Home Area Network (HAN).
• Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): The meters are connected among themselves through a mesh or hierarchical or hybrid network termed as NAN. The network may be wired (e.g. PLC) or wireless (e.g. WiFi, ZigBee, GPRS). The head end of the NAN is the data concentrator or gateway which is connected to back office by a dedicated wired or wireless connection (optical fiber, cellular network, etc.).
• Control center/Hardware and software control system/Utility back office/SP: The control center receives the consumption data from the AMI network and uses them for making bills. This fine grained data can be used to optimize power generation and distribution. Besides that, electricity distribution, control, and monitoring is performed from the control center.
• Master server: In our architecture, the master server is semi-trusted. When a meter requests the key, the master server generates a public key and private key pair. The master server uni-casts the public key to the specific meter for data encryption and the corresponding private key is sent to the auxiliary server and control center for data decryption.
• Auxiliary server: Before the encryption of data with the public key sent by the master server, the smart meter generates a random sequence. This random sequence is sent as encrypted by public key to auxiliary server. The auxiliary server receives random sequence and authenticates it by the private key of smart meter before forwarding it to the control center for final decryption.
IV. OC-SVM AND RSS ALGORITHM, AND ENTROPY OF
A DATA PACKET
In our scheme, we use RSS for the localization of meter, and OC-SVM for node-to-node authentication. In the rest of this section, we describe the two algorithms, and security strength calculation of a data packet by entropy in further detail.
A. Received Signal Strength (RSS) based localization
RSS based localization can be used in localizing a new meter in collaboration with meters whose positions are already known. The location information is used to authenticate the source node using OCSVM.
Let us consider an unknown positioned meter at a location (x, y) accompanied by partially dispersed known position meters at locations (x l , y l ), where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. The received signal strength at location (x l , y l ) can be denoted by ψ l
where c is an unknown constant that depends on transmitted power, frequency etc, and γ is the path loss constant. For a lossy environment, the typical value of γ is 4-6. In our model, γ = 2.93 has been used considering residential area. The parameter d l is the euclidean distance between the known and unknown position meter defined as follows:
and w l is the zero mean random Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ l . The value of σ l ranges from 6 to 12 dB.
Let us define, the θ and
The likelihood function of θ for a given RSS measurement ψ, f (θ|ψ) is given by
where c 1 is a constant.
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of θ, denoted byθ, can be found from the following equation
The above equation is an optimization problem. Various optimization techniques such as differential evolution, dynamic relaxation and particle swarp optimization (PSO) can be used to solved (4) . In our problem, we used PSO to solve the nonlinear optimization problem. Finally, the ML estimator yields the location (x, y) and reference power z of the unknown positioned meter
B. OCSVM algorithm The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a machine learning algorithm based on modern statistical learning theory [20] , [21] . It separates two classes by constructing a hyper surface in the input space. In this input space, the input is mapped to a higher dimensional feature space by non-linear mapping. In this section, we describe OCSVM for segregating outliers from a cluster of data.
Let us consider a data space Ψ = (
..., n} where x i ∈ R d is the input data and y i ∈ {−1, +1} is the corresponding output pattern in the dedicating class membership. SVM first projects the input vector x to a higher dimensional space H by a non-linear operator Φ(·) : R n ←→ H where the data projection is linearly separable. The non-linear SVM classification is defined as
which is linear in terms of projected data Φ(x) and non-linear in terms of original data x. 
such that
where c > 0 is the regularization parameter that determines the trade-off of maximizing the margin and the number of training data within the margin (thus reducing the training errors). To minimize the objective function of (7) by using the Lagrange multipliers technique, the necessary condition for w is
where γ i > 0, i = 0, 1, 2.....n are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints in equation (8) . The Lagrange multipliers (γ i ) can be solved from equation (7) and written as
In (10), k(x, y) = Φ(x) T Φ(y) is known as the kernel function. It determines the mapping of the input vector to a high dimensional feature space. In this paper, we consider two kernel functions. The Guassian RBP kernel is given by:
Gaussian RBF kernel: k(x, y) = exp( OCSVM detects abnormal data within a class [21] . OCSVM maps the input vector to feature dimension according to the kernel function and separates it from the origin with maximum margin. It penalizes the outliers by employing slack variables ξ in the objective function and controls carefully the trade off between empirical risk and regularize the penalty. 
such that (w · Φ(x i ) ≥ ρ − ξ i , and ξ i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n.
where Φ is the kernel function for mapping, ξ i is the slack variables, v ∈ (0, 1] is a prior fixed constant, and ρ is the decision value that determines whether a given point falls within the estimated high density region. Then the resultant decision function f m w,p (x) takes the form
where ρ * and w * are the values of w and ρ solving from the equation (12) .
In OCSVM, v characterizes the solution instead of c (smoothness operation)-
• It determines an upper bound on the fraction of outliers.
• It is the lower bound on the number of training examples used as support vector. Due to the high significance of v, OCSVM is also termed as v − SVM.
Since RSS algorithm can pinpoint the location of neighboring meters based on received electromagnetic signals, and OCSVM can detect anomaly in input data set, the combination of these two algorithms makes it possible to identify false nodes. In our security scheme, OCSVM utilizes packet size, frequency of data transmission and node identity along with the node position for meter authentication. The details have been provided in the next section.
C. Entropy of a data packet
Entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of a random variable or data packet. The more certain about a value, the smaller is the entropy value.
The entropy for a sequence S H(s) = S P (S = x) log 2 P (S = x) where P (S = x) is the probability of taking S a value over x.
If the size of a random variable or packet generated by the meter is n bit, then the entropy and security strength of the data packet are n and 2 n respectively.
V. TRAFFIC FLOW PROCESS
In this section, the privacy scheme implementation process and the data flow are described in detail.
In our architecture, we assume the following assumption:
• The Master and Auxiliary servers are independent and semi-trusted. However, the servers might physically be one but virtually divided into two servers.
• The wireless communication links between servers and meters are not fully reliable.
• The meters have limited memory and computational ability.
• The control center has adequate computational ability.
• The meters keep the records of position of neighboring meters, frequency of transmission, packet size and node identity. Frequency of transmission, node identity and packet size are extracted from the packet header. The node position is derived from electromagnetic signals using RSS based localization as explained in previous section IV(A).
• Every meter transmits data at a constant transmission power.
• The packet size is constant for every meter.
• When a new meter is installed, it starts to record the position of the neighbor meters, frequency of data transmission, node identity and packet size. 
Notation Description
SMi Smart meter i AEi Asymmetric encryption scheme for node/ meter i ki Randomized key generation algorithm for node/ meter i Ei Encryption algorithm for node i Di Deterministic decryption algorithm for node i p k Public key s k
Secret key Mi
Message/data of meter/node i Ci Encrypted data/ Message of node/ meter i t Time instance (m1, m2, ......., mn) ∈ C Segmented packets of message C (s1, s2, ...., sn) ∈ S Random sequences (p1, p2, ......, pn) ∈ P Probability of ith packet transmission at each time instant t γ Path loss component δ l
Variance of random noise PSO Particle swarm optimization One-class SVM One class Support Vector Machine
A. Basic Notifications and definitions
The notifications and definitions used in our algorithm are stated in Table I .
B. Data flow
The data flow (as shown in Fig. 4 ) among the meters, servers and control center has be explained here in details.
STEP 1: Initialization SM 1 sends a request for a public key before sending data. The Master server generates a public key and private key pair. The public key is unicasted to SM 1 for data encryption. Additionally, the corresponding private key is sent to the Auxiliary server and the control center.
Key generation by asymmetric algorithm:
STEP 2: Encryption
The SM 1 generates a random sequence (S). S is encrypted by the received public key and is sent to the Auxiliary server. The Auxiliary server receives the cypher text and decodes it by the secret key. After that the Auxiliary server sends the sequence S to the control center. At the same time, the consumption data is encrypted and processed by the following method:
Encryption of data:
Segmentation of the encrypted data into n packets:
Ordering packets by random sequence: Proceed to next step 7: end if with greater probability ¡ probability distribution (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , ...., p n ) 12: End STEP 4: Hop to hop data aggregation and forwarding Based on previous data receiving records containing node identity, sender node's position, frequency of data received and packet size-the node SM 2 verifies source node SM 1 and forwards data to the next node SM 3 . OCSVM algorithm is used to authenticate the source node. The data aggregation and forwarding algorithm pseudocode is tabulated in Algorithm 2: STEP 5: Data retrieval The control center receives the randomized and encrypted packets and decodes them by the secret key p k and random sequence S. Reordering the data:
VI. SIMULATION RESULT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS A. Simulation result
To get insights into the localization of the meters, we used a suburban building block topology (Manhattan grid) [22] in which we used rectangle and hexagon shape as area of interest (AOI). In an AOI, each edge is a known positioned meter and the center is the emitter (unknown positioned meter). In Matlab simulation, we used γ = 2.93 and σ l = 12 dB. Furthermore, for optimization PSO was used whereas residential pathloss model was considered for pathloss calculation.
With an increase in the number of nodes (meters), the Mean Square Error (MSE) from the exact position of the meter decreases as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Furthermore, as the variance Record data transmission history (frequency of transmission, location of neighbor meter, packet size, node identity ) for time h
4:
Send attach request to control center 5: Receive approval of new meter 6: else 7: Derive SM i 's location from received electromagnetic signal 8: Get frequency (time difference between two packet sending), node identity, packet size from header information of packet 9: Run OCSVM algorithm 10: if the new data and previous data belong to same group then 11: Forward data to the next meter 12: else 13: Cease data transmission and report to control center 14: end if 15: end if In the second part of simulation using Python, we use OCSVM for novelty/anomaly detection in a given data set. It takes node identity, node's position, frequency of transmission and packet size as new data set. The previous authenticate data set or fraction of new data set can be used as training data. In the simulation environment, we generate random 100 training observations, 20 normal regular observations and 20 abnormal observations. The red line (as shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) is the learned decision function that separates abnormal data from the normal regular data. As shown in Fig.7 , OCSVM draws a learned decision boundary based on 100 training clean data, of which 12 data falls outside the decision boundary erroneously. Following this, among the 20 regular novel data 3 data falls outside the boundary and all 20 abnormal data falls outside the decision boundary. So for 100 training data, OCSVM can detect anomaly with 100% accuracy (0 error in novel abnormal detection). If we reduce the number of training samples to 20, the performance of OCSVM decreases (1 error in 20 novel abnormal detection) which is depicted in Fig. 8 .
Now we use the polluted data for training purposes, which is a fraction of the input data. There is no separate clean training sample in this case. We also compare OCSVM with Variance (σ 2 ) of Gaussian noise.
robust covariance estimator for different kinds of input data distribution. In this case, we generate 100 samples, 10% of which are outliers/abnormal. For a well-centered and elliptic input data set, OCSVM and robust covariance estimator show the same performance as illustrated in Fig. 9 . For a bi-modal distribution of data, OCSVM shows better performance than the robust covariance estimator. This is depicted in Fig. 10 . For the non-Gaussian distributed input data, the performance of both the methods degrades, wherein OCSVM shows better performance than the robust covariance estimator, illustrated in Fig. 11 .
B. Security strength analysis
Let us assume, a meter sends a consumption unit packet of size 256 bit encrypted by 256 bit asymmetric key to the central database of control center. If the packet is subdivided into 32 blocks with each block having a size of 8, and a block is transmitted each time according to a random sequence, then the entropy is 256. The security strength of the data packet is 2 256 . Furthermore, the security strength of a 256 bit asymmetric key is 2 256/2 . So, for 32 random sequenced packets and 256 bit asymmetric key, Total security strength of the data packet = 2 256 + 2
256/2
Hence, a hacker needs a maximum (2 256 + 2 256/2 ) number of iterations (tries) to decrypt a message, which is impractical.
VII. CONCLUSION In our security scheme, a two-level security method has been proposed-data encryption and node authentication. In the data encryption level, encryption by asymmetric keys and randomization of data packets have been proposed. In the conventional key management system, only data encryption is used. On the other hand, in our scheme, randomization of packets along with data encryption ensures enhanced data security. Another contribution of our scheme is the introduction of node-to-node authentication by OCSVM, which utilizes four variables-meter ID, frequency of data reception from a specific meter, packet size and meter position. The information of meter ID, data frequency and packet size is easily extractable from the packet header. On the otherhand, for meter's position RSS is used and it is almost constant due to stationary position of the meters.
For TTP-to-smart meter communication, we need a bidirectional communication similar to meter data communication. Since the communication between meters and servers happens once per every session of sending the meter data to the control center, it doesn't hamper the normal traffic flow between the meters and control center. Further, since a random sequence along with the asymmetric key is used to retrieve data in the control center, it also helps to verify data flow from a specific smart meter. 
